The pardon is bad because Hunter is Biden's son. The pardon is justified, or at least, not as bad, because the only reason Hunter is in legal jeopardy is that he's Biden's son. If Hunter is facing a conviction, but no jail time, a pardon seems highly inappropriate. If Hunter is facing jail time, it seems pretty extreme to allow him to go to jail, just to honor norms that only one party adheres to, or is even expected to adhere to.
If Biden or Harris had won the election, I doubt very seriously either of them would've pardoned Hunter at this time. Let justice take its course, and if Hunter is sentenced to jail, maybe commute his sentence after he's served a reasonable portion. Of course, that option isn't on the table.
This seems right to me. And the blanket pardon suggests fears of future prosecution. If only we could invent like a pardon-commutation (imposed plea deal)?
I think there's also a reasonable case that there should be more restrictions on advising activities by family members of elected officials, along with stock trading by members of Congress and their families. (There was an op-ed on this years back in the Post I think, but my google skills are failing me).
I think it would also have helped if Biden could admit that what his son was doing was wrong, even if it was not illegal.
I don't think anti-corruption rules are a panacea, they tend to be used against opponents of the party in power and often turn on complications that are not especially parseable by the public. Simpler, if sometimes dumb rules, are probably better here, even if they are one more reason normal people would be unlikely to pursue elected office.
I've had my heart broken too many times to think that good governance reform will restore public trust in institutions but at least removes a potential advantage to would-be patrimonial autocrats.
That said, putting on my political science hat, I should probably look for some good review articles about comparative forms of counter-corruption efforts and which are most legible to the public and have the most manageable secondary effects. I suspect we probably do not net-net need more anti-corruption rules than we had before the Roberts court began gutting them, but I imagine they could be much better designed.
The pardon is bad because Hunter is Biden's son. The pardon is justified, or at least, not as bad, because the only reason Hunter is in legal jeopardy is that he's Biden's son. If Hunter is facing a conviction, but no jail time, a pardon seems highly inappropriate. If Hunter is facing jail time, it seems pretty extreme to allow him to go to jail, just to honor norms that only one party adheres to, or is even expected to adhere to.
If Biden or Harris had won the election, I doubt very seriously either of them would've pardoned Hunter at this time. Let justice take its course, and if Hunter is sentenced to jail, maybe commute his sentence after he's served a reasonable portion. Of course, that option isn't on the table.
This seems right to me. And the blanket pardon suggests fears of future prosecution. If only we could invent like a pardon-commutation (imposed plea deal)?
I think there's also a reasonable case that there should be more restrictions on advising activities by family members of elected officials, along with stock trading by members of Congress and their families. (There was an op-ed on this years back in the Post I think, but my google skills are failing me).
I think it would also have helped if Biden could admit that what his son was doing was wrong, even if it was not illegal.
I don't think anti-corruption rules are a panacea, they tend to be used against opponents of the party in power and often turn on complications that are not especially parseable by the public. Simpler, if sometimes dumb rules, are probably better here, even if they are one more reason normal people would be unlikely to pursue elected office.
I've had my heart broken too many times to think that good governance reform will restore public trust in institutions but at least removes a potential advantage to would-be patrimonial autocrats.
That said, putting on my political science hat, I should probably look for some good review articles about comparative forms of counter-corruption efforts and which are most legible to the public and have the most manageable secondary effects. I suspect we probably do not net-net need more anti-corruption rules than we had before the Roberts court began gutting them, but I imagine they could be much better designed.