Yes but. I generally agree, but I think you’re exaggerating a bit. There’s a lot of ruin in an order, and the alternatives to the system we’ve been living in are so flawed and unpleasant that switching or even hedging seriously will be difficult, costly, and psychologically wrenching. So it will take serious continued outrages by the administration to complete the order destruction job they’ve begun. (I think what ultimately happens in Ukraine will be key here, and we just don’t know that yet.)
I just took part in a debate in Berlin on whether Europe could still rely on an American extended nuclear deterrent or should explore alternatives to it. (I was on team b😱) The audience vote at the end was 50-50–less because people didn’t fear Russia or did trust Trump but because the alternative courses of action were so implausible or unpalatable.
So we may get to where you say we are down the road a bit, but I don’t think we’re quite there just yet.
Given that, I think way to address the article-writing challenge you bring up is to hedge, or incorporate multiple scenarios for advice. That is, I see no problems saying, “China is a big problem and the ideal way to deal with it is through a coordinated response with our allies involving X, Y, and Z.” That’s true!
But then one has to go on and say, “Unfortunately, that course of action is a nonstarter in Washington today, and should it become politically feasible here later, there may not be strong alliances to coordinate. So the best that might be possible right now is course B, which would achieve this but not that.”
My response got eaten somehow so I will retype it from faulty memory.
I hope you are right in your first half! I would prefer to bet against myself. I am not sure Ukraine is the lone rock on which US credibility can be dashed (for one, I think that the delay in aid in 2023 had already led to a downgrade in US ratings from allies, and if not they need to get better risk analysts), but I do see your point about events being more irretrievable than actions. But I also think that the range of discussions we are having now is evidence that something profound has shifted and that the Overton window of politics is different. For me, the Rubicon was / will be Merz -- the proposal and then if he can effectuate the shift. Other confirmatory evidence comes from the sudden popularity of the Gripen.
On the second half, I wholeheartedly agree. In essence, pieces need to start where they once would have begun and then try to lay out second-best strategies. That's a tall order, because we aren't trained to think in those terms (at least not as strenuously) and because the nature of the environment means that fully laying out arguments in public may be risky to the viability of those concerns.
I am also Team B, and I am deeply annoyed that de Gaulle turned out, in the long run, to be right. Score one against "security community" theory, I guess.
So, the question of what the theoretical (as opposed to practical) implications of recent events are is fascinating. Have been grappling with how to update my Intro IR syllabus for the fall.
ALL structural theories are in weaker shape now, I think, given the demonstration of the power of this individual agency we’ve been witnessing. So the first change is to add some Carlyle (like DeGaulle, once a laugh line, now relevant). Toying with the idea of adding some Milgram, to account for followers as well as leaders. What else needs to be rethought?
A masterly two-graph lead for a stunning takedown of conventional wisdom - with an actual prescription for a better way for peddlers of said wisdom to spend their time during the end time. Bravo! Having said that....was your omission of John Kenneth before Galbraith an irony meant to display the airy insularity and arrogance of the CW world where of course EVERYONE knows who you meant? Or did you simply forget a cardinal rule of journalism: full name on first reference?
first, thanks -- any compliment from YOU about a lede is a real compliment! second, chalk this up to faculty insularity--of _course_ everyone knows which Galbraith I meant!--coupled with a lack of copy editors to pull me back from the faculty lounge.
Confession: In writing my comment I violated an even more cardinal (if there can degrees of cardinal) rule of journalism: Never assume anything. Without checking for other Galbraiths, I blithely assumed you meant JK, based on my memory of his appearances as guest parrier on William Buckley's "Firing Line" and his ubiquitous writings, especially "An Ambassador's Journal," a delightful memoir of his time as JFK's ambassador to India. Bottom line, I got lucky there wasn't another JKG out there.
I looked him up. An economist no less! But James not John. I barely dodged the bullet! "Mononym" - thank you for that Buckley-ish word. We need to work on one for the author of Systematic Hatreds.
Way back in days of yore when I was a student in Econ 101 we were assigned The Affluent Society as a supplementary reading - there is a piece to be written on how a public intellectual who had such great stature* has no lasting memory in our discourse.
Circa 1971, I encountered him on the streets of London and was shocked by how tall he was, careering down the sidewalk like a giant scarecrow off the leash.
I have personally been dating the formal end of the post-war liberal order to "liberation day" if only for the bitter dramatic irony of the naming, so i take your larger point.
That said, I presently believe that some form of network of alliance will, pending what happens in coming months, still be there but notably lacking in the trust that is their fertilizer.
My basis for that assessment is U.S. technological and industrial capacity, which even if surpassed in some domains by China is still years out of reach in many areas even if a united Europe puts their mind and debt financing to it. That said the admin is setting alight US scientific seed corn and industrial supply chains right now, so what preminence we maintain may prove a wasting asset.
The second best world i contemplate is what forms of alliance cooperation are still possible now that the old assurances no longer apply. I have my ideas.
But to answer your question my go to analogy is Brexit. Both obvious and quite possibly too low magnitude, but i would eagerly read a study outlining what we should proportionately expect.
Yes but. I generally agree, but I think you’re exaggerating a bit. There’s a lot of ruin in an order, and the alternatives to the system we’ve been living in are so flawed and unpleasant that switching or even hedging seriously will be difficult, costly, and psychologically wrenching. So it will take serious continued outrages by the administration to complete the order destruction job they’ve begun. (I think what ultimately happens in Ukraine will be key here, and we just don’t know that yet.)
I just took part in a debate in Berlin on whether Europe could still rely on an American extended nuclear deterrent or should explore alternatives to it. (I was on team b😱) The audience vote at the end was 50-50–less because people didn’t fear Russia or did trust Trump but because the alternative courses of action were so implausible or unpalatable.
So we may get to where you say we are down the road a bit, but I don’t think we’re quite there just yet.
Given that, I think way to address the article-writing challenge you bring up is to hedge, or incorporate multiple scenarios for advice. That is, I see no problems saying, “China is a big problem and the ideal way to deal with it is through a coordinated response with our allies involving X, Y, and Z.” That’s true!
But then one has to go on and say, “Unfortunately, that course of action is a nonstarter in Washington today, and should it become politically feasible here later, there may not be strong alliances to coordinate. So the best that might be possible right now is course B, which would achieve this but not that.”
My response got eaten somehow so I will retype it from faulty memory.
I hope you are right in your first half! I would prefer to bet against myself. I am not sure Ukraine is the lone rock on which US credibility can be dashed (for one, I think that the delay in aid in 2023 had already led to a downgrade in US ratings from allies, and if not they need to get better risk analysts), but I do see your point about events being more irretrievable than actions. But I also think that the range of discussions we are having now is evidence that something profound has shifted and that the Overton window of politics is different. For me, the Rubicon was / will be Merz -- the proposal and then if he can effectuate the shift. Other confirmatory evidence comes from the sudden popularity of the Gripen.
On the second half, I wholeheartedly agree. In essence, pieces need to start where they once would have begun and then try to lay out second-best strategies. That's a tall order, because we aren't trained to think in those terms (at least not as strenuously) and because the nature of the environment means that fully laying out arguments in public may be risky to the viability of those concerns.
I am also Team B, and I am deeply annoyed that de Gaulle turned out, in the long run, to be right. Score one against "security community" theory, I guess.
So, the question of what the theoretical (as opposed to practical) implications of recent events are is fascinating. Have been grappling with how to update my Intro IR syllabus for the fall.
ALL structural theories are in weaker shape now, I think, given the demonstration of the power of this individual agency we’ve been witnessing. So the first change is to add some Carlyle (like DeGaulle, once a laugh line, now relevant). Toying with the idea of adding some Milgram, to account for followers as well as leaders. What else needs to be rethought?
A masterly two-graph lead for a stunning takedown of conventional wisdom - with an actual prescription for a better way for peddlers of said wisdom to spend their time during the end time. Bravo! Having said that....was your omission of John Kenneth before Galbraith an irony meant to display the airy insularity and arrogance of the CW world where of course EVERYONE knows who you meant? Or did you simply forget a cardinal rule of journalism: full name on first reference?
first, thanks -- any compliment from YOU about a lede is a real compliment! second, chalk this up to faculty insularity--of _course_ everyone knows which Galbraith I meant!--coupled with a lack of copy editors to pull me back from the faculty lounge.
Confession: In writing my comment I violated an even more cardinal (if there can degrees of cardinal) rule of journalism: Never assume anything. Without checking for other Galbraiths, I blithely assumed you meant JK, based on my memory of his appearances as guest parrier on William Buckley's "Firing Line" and his ubiquitous writings, especially "An Ambassador's Journal," a delightful memoir of his time as JFK's ambassador to India. Bottom line, I got lucky there wasn't another JKG out there.
There is in fact a James K. Galbraith, who is noted in his own right, but not mononymically.
I looked him up. An economist no less! But James not John. I barely dodged the bullet! "Mononym" - thank you for that Buckley-ish word. We need to work on one for the author of Systematic Hatreds.
Way back in days of yore when I was a student in Econ 101 we were assigned The Affluent Society as a supplementary reading - there is a piece to be written on how a public intellectual who had such great stature* has no lasting memory in our discourse.
* he was, in fact, very tall
And crypto Canadian!
Our classes, like our radio stations, were governed by regulations stipulating Canadian content
Circa 1971, I encountered him on the streets of London and was shocked by how tall he was, careering down the sidewalk like a giant scarecrow off the leash.
AMAZING
Unrelated, tho
https://www.standard.co.uk/culture/books/robert-galbraith-jk-rowling-cormoran-strike-ink-black-heart-b1024038.html
Sharp memory
I have personally been dating the formal end of the post-war liberal order to "liberation day" if only for the bitter dramatic irony of the naming, so i take your larger point.
That said, I presently believe that some form of network of alliance will, pending what happens in coming months, still be there but notably lacking in the trust that is their fertilizer.
My basis for that assessment is U.S. technological and industrial capacity, which even if surpassed in some domains by China is still years out of reach in many areas even if a united Europe puts their mind and debt financing to it. That said the admin is setting alight US scientific seed corn and industrial supply chains right now, so what preminence we maintain may prove a wasting asset.
The second best world i contemplate is what forms of alliance cooperation are still possible now that the old assurances no longer apply. I have my ideas.
But to answer your question my go to analogy is Brexit. Both obvious and quite possibly too low magnitude, but i would eagerly read a study outlining what we should proportionately expect.
Good grief! Reading further about James, just discovered John was his old man.
Don’t forget the rest of the family…
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Galbraith
Now THAT is a life